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Abstract 
The relationship between development and governance is a central question in the 
public administration literature on developing countries. Yet, we still understand little 
about the gap between urban and rural governance in these nations. Our paper tackles 
this issue using the novel Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration 
Performance Index (PAPI). PAPI is Vietnam’s largest nationwide survey, and it is 
considers six dimensions of local public administration, including participation, 
transparency, accountability, corruption control, administrative procedures, and public 
service delivery. Using a small area estimation approach we present three new findings. 
First, urban citizens report better local governance and public administration than rural 
citizens do. Second, districts with better reported governance tend to have a smaller 
urban-rural public administration gap. Third, this gap follows a U-shaped pattern, 
decreasing initially and then increasing slightly as local living standards rise. These 
findings have implications for priorities in public administration reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
The links between development, governance, and public administration have been a 
central question in the research on developing countries. Institutionalists Krueger (1974) 
and North (1994, 1995) point out that good governance reduces transaction costs for 
economic activities. Stiglitz (2002) and other New-Keynesians show that transparent 
legal frameworks and clear tax policies allow the market to function. More recently, 
Brinkerhoff (2008) argues that improving governance, at both national and international 
levels, is key to promoting development in poor countries. There is also increasing 
recognition that good governance and public administration are important for human 
development (Acuña-Alfaro et al., 2010; UNDP, 2011). 
At the same time, the large economic gap between urban and rural areas during 
the development process has attracted a large literature. For example, Krugman (1991), 
Fujita et al. (1999), and Quigley (2008) point out that the geographical agglomeration of 
people and firms in urban areas leads to lower production costs and higher productivity, 
which naturally creates an urban-rural gap. Further, Sahn and Stifel (2004), Park (2008), 
Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2012), Hong-Liu et al. (2012), and many others find persistent 
gaps in the poverty and welfare of rural and urban areas.  
However, little has been said—and little is known—about the governance gap 
between urban and rural areas. Saich (2007) is one of the few studies that examine the 
urban-rural gap in citizens’ perception of governance. His study finds that urban 
Chinese citizens are less satisfied with central and provincial governance but more 
satisfied with grassroots governance than rural citizens are. In fact, the urban-rural gap 
in governance derives from differences in determinants of availability, accessibility, and 
quality of governance and public administration services between urban and rural areas. 
Since governance and public administration are multi-dimensional concepts, the urban-
rural gap in governance can be resultant of differences in these dimensions. Given that 
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governance is an important determinant of economic growth and welfare, understanding 
the urban-rural governance gap can help reduce urban-rural gaps in economic 
development and welfare.    
A key challenge in studying this gap is the lack of good data on governance in 
urban and rural areas. To address this challenge, the Vietnamese government launched 
the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index Survey 
(PAPI) in 2011. PAPI measures the quality of governance as it is experienced by 
citizens in six dimensions: (i) participation at local levels, (ii) transparency of 
information, (iii) vertical accountability, (iv) control of corruption, (v) public 
administrative procedures, and (vi) public service delivery. These dimensions are based 
on conceptual frameworks on governance by a number of previous researchers 
(Leftwich, 1994; La Porta et al., 1999; UNDP, 2002; Al-Marhubi, 2004).  
In this study, we examine the gap between urban and rural governance in 
Vietnam at the central and local levels. The study has two main objectives. First, we use 
data from the PAPI survey in 2011 to measure the differences between urban and rural 
areas in six domains of public governance. Second, we estimate the spatial gap in urban 
and rural governance and examine the factors associated with the gap in governance 
quality at the district level.  
We find that urban areas tend to outperform rural areas in most governance 
dimensions, except for participation in local governance decisions and vertical 
accountability. Urban citizens experience better overall governance and public 
administration outputs (as measured by the composite measure of PAPI) than rural 
citizens do. Further, urban citizens are more satisfied with local governance than rural 
citizens are, but the two groups have the same level of satisfaction with regard to central 
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governance. This indicates that the rural-urban governance gap is conceivably not due 
to differences in citizens’ perceptions. 
A challenge in estimating the governance indicator (PAPI index) at the district 
level is that the PAPI survey is not representative at the district level. To overcome this 
small sample size problem, we combine the 2011 PAPI survey and the 2009 Vietnam 
Population and Housing Census using a small area estimation method (Elbers et al., 
2002, 2003). Thus, we first estimate the governance quality of urban and rural districts, 
and the urban-rural gap in governance quality at the district level. Then we regress this 
urban-rural gap on several economic explanatory variables. We find that districts with 
better governance tend to have lower urban-rural governance gaps. Further, the urban-
rural governance gap and the welfare level measured by per capita expenditure have a 
U-shaped association. This urban-rural gap decreases as the mean expenditure increases 
in the initial stage, but it slightly increases in the later stage.  
 This paper is organized into seven sections, including this introduction. The 
second section describes the context. The third section explains the data sets used in this 
study and the rationale for their selection. The fourth section presents the measurement 
of governance quality and public administration and their relation between urban 
contexts and governance quality. The method of analysis of urban-rural differences in 
governance quality is presented in the fifth section. The sixth sections discuss the 
empirical findings, to be followed by concluding remarks in the last section. 
 
2. Vietnam 
Vietnam, a single-party regime, has achieved so remarkable a rate of economic growth 
and poverty reduction during the past two decades that it has been dubbed a “poster 
child” for development agencies. Poverty dramatically dropped from 58 percent in 1993 
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to 15 percent in 2008. Due to unprecedented levels of socio-economic development in 
Vietnam, a significant number of citizens now enjoy longer and healthier lives as well 
as increased levels of education (UNDP, 2011). The speed of economic growth and 
poverty reduction in Vietnam, however, has decelerated recently. Poverty rates remain 
unchanged, perhaps due to the inelasticity of poverty measures, and while Vietnam’s 
economy is still growing in terms of GDP rate, it is doing so at Vietnam’s slowest pace 
of the last decade (World Bank, 2013). Urbanization as well as the rate of progress in 
cities and the still laggard pace of development in rural areas are development processes 
of significant concern. 
Ensuring good governance for poverty reduction has been regarded as one of the 
Vietnam Development Goals (Poverty Task Force, 2002).1 Aiming to improve 
governance quality, Vietnam has pushed for Public Administration Reform since the 
1990s. The main priority areas of this reform program include political orientation, 
institutional reform, organizational restructuring, human resource management, and 
public finance management (Painter, 2003; Acuña-Alfaro, 2009).  
However, there has been a gap in public administration reform between urban 
and rural areas. The World Bank (2009) observes that successes in public administration 
reform are more common in better-off urban areas, but more ambiguous in poor, rural, 
and mountainous areas. There has also been a large gap in public services between 
urban and rural areas. The World Bank (2003 and 2012) finds that rural households are 
less likely to have access to quality roads, electricity, sanitation, and clean water. 
Households in rural areas also have more limited access to information than urban 
households. However, rural people are more likely to participate in local community 
                                                 
1
 In Vietnam, there is a positive relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI) and the 
Vietnam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) at the provincial level 
(CECODES, FF, CPP, and UNDP, 2012; UNDP, 2011). Thai and Le (2012) find the positive effect of 
public administration reform on GDP per capita of provinces in Vietnam. 
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activities such as poverty assessment meetings and village meetings on poverty 
reduction programs.2 In some dimensions such as corruption and bribery, rural and 
urban experiences are similar according to CECODES, FR, CPP, and UNDP (2012). 
Thus, it is not clear whether or not rural citizens experience a lower quality of 
governance than urban citizens do.  
 
3. Data 
This study exploits two datasets. The main data is the PAPI survey conducted by the 
Center for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES), the Fatherland 
Front, and the United Nations Development Programmes. This survey uses clustered 
random sampling. In 2009, the PAPI survey sampled three provinces, and in 2010 it 
sampled 30 provinces. In 2011, all 63 provinces were covered by the sample, with 
13,642 total respondents. In this study we will use the 2011 PAPI survey, as it was the 
first nationwide exercise of its kind in Vietnam. A more detailed discussion of the 2011 
PAPI survey is presented in CECODES, FR, CPP, and UNDP (2012). 
The second data set is the 15-percent sample of the Vietnam Population and 
Housing Census (VPHC) conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam in April 
2009. This census contains detailed data on individuals and households. Individual data 
include information on demographics, education, employment, disability, and 
migration. Household data includes information on durable assets and housing 
conditions. The 15-percent sample is representative at the district level. The census 
covered 3,692,042 households with 14,177,590 individuals.  
                                                 
2
 A large number of studies disagree about the importance of public participation in governance. Some of 
them suggest that relationships between local people and governments can improve the quality of local 
governance (Roberts, 1997; Smith and Huntsman, 1997; King and Stivers, 1998, Plein et al., 1998). 
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It should be noted that we use the 2011 PAPI survey instead of the 2012 survey 
to estimate our models, since the Census that is used to predict the PAPI in small areas 
was conducted in 2009. If the difference between the year of the survey and the year of 
the census is large, the estimates for small areas could be biased. Ideally, both the PAPI 
survey and the Census would be conducted in the same year. However, this was not the 
case. As a result, we use the 2011 PAPI, which is closer to the year of the 2009 Census, 
to estimate our models. 
 
4. The urban-rural gap in governance and public administration 
The PAPI survey solicits citizens’ feedback on quality of governance and on the public 
administration outputs they receive from their local authorities; we use this detailed 
information to examine patterns and differences in local governance and public 
administration between urban and rural areas. Following the PAPI approach, we 
measure governance quality and public administration in Vietnam by aggregate indexes 
of six dimensions, including participation, transparency, vertical accountability, control 
of corruption, public administrative procedures, and public service delivery. Each 
dimension is measured by an aggregate indicator. Each indicator is measured by several 
sub-dimensions, and each sub-dimension is computed from several raw indicators that 
are estimated directly from PAPI survey questions. The survey poses these questions to 
citizens in order to collect data on their assessment of governance, public 
administration, and public services. Indicators are selected to reflect aspects of 
governance and public administration. Indicators as well as aggregate indexes of 
dimension are standardized from 1 to 10 so that 1 means the poorest performance and 
10 means the best performance in terms of governance and public administration. 
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Table 1 presents the aggregate index of six dimensions by urban and rural areas 
in 2011. We present the index by city grade.3 Urban areas in Vietnam are classified 
according to different grades (classes) depending on the city’s population density, socio-
economic role in areas, industrialization level, infrastructure, etc. The most import cities 
are defined as special cities. Other cities are classified from 1 to 5, with the smaller 
value meaning larger cities. 
To test whether the urban-rural difference in governance is statistically 
significant, we regress these governance indicators on urban and city dummies (reported 
in tables 2 and 3). Overall, urban areas perform better than rural areas in most 
dimensions. The difference is particularly strong in public service delivery. There are no 
statistical differences between urban and rural areas in participation in village decisions 
and vertical accountability.4 When urban areas are disaggregated into cities of different 
grades, large cities tend to have better performance of transparency in local decision-
making, control of corruption, and public service delivery.  
 Columns 7 and 8 of table 1 present the composite measures for the PAPI index, 
weighted and unweighted. The PAPI varies from 6 (lowest possible score) to 60 points 
(maximum possible score), with higher points meaning better governance and public 
administration performance. Urban areas outperform rural areas significantly on these 
two composite measures, consistent with the general pattern we observe when 
comparing separate dimensions. 
In columns 9 and 10, we compare the overall satisfaction of people with local 
and central governance between urban and rural citizens.  The statistics show that urban 
people report better assessment of governance quality and public administration. People 
                                                 
3
 A detailed definition of cities is provided in Decree No. 42/2009/NĐ-CP of the Government of Vietnam, 
dated 07/05/2009. 
4
 This vertical accountability dimension is comprised of three sub-dimensions including (i) citizen’s 
interactions with local authorities, (ii) People’s Inspection Boards (PIBs), and (iii) Community 
Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs). 
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in larger cities also tend to have a better view of governance than those in smaller cities. 
Note that while urban citizens are more likely to be satisfied with local governance than 
rural citizens, they have a similar level of satisfaction with central governance. This 
makes sense because the two groups are governed by the same central government but 
by different local authorities. Further, citizens in larger cities are more likely to have 
better experiences with local governance than those in small cities.  
One interesting exception is that citizens in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh cities, 
which are the two special cities, have lower assessments for central governance than 
citizens in rural areas and other cities. This is likely because citizens in Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh cities have more direct interactions with the central government. 
5. Urban-rural differences in governance quality: methodology  
Small area estimation method 
The main objective of this study is to examine the spatial difference in governance 
quality between urban and rural areas, and then subsequently to investigate several 
factors associated with this urban-rural difference. We measure overall governance and 
public administration quality by the aggregate index of PAPI. At the provincial level, 
we can compute the difference in satisfaction level between urban and rural individuals: 
      rup PAPIPAPID −= ,       (1) 
where pD is the urban-rural difference in governance, uPAPI  and rPAPI  are the means 
of PAPI for urban and rural individuals, respectively. 
We can use an equation similar to (1) to estimate the urban-rural difference in 
governance at the district level. However, the PAPI surveys are not representative at the 
district level due to the small number of observations at the district level. To predict 
PAPI in small areas such as districts, we use the small area estimation method 
 10 
 
developed by Elbers et al. (2002, 2003). We combine the 2011 PAPI with the 2009 
VPHC survey. The small area estimation is often applied to predict poverty and 
inequality measures in small areas. In Vietnam, it has been widely applied to construct 
poverty maps (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2010; Nguyen, 2011). 
The Elbers et al. (2002, 2003) method can be described in three steps as follows. 
In the first step, we select common variables of the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC. The 
common variables include household and individual characteristics, district 
characteristics, and area mean variables computed from the census. Area mean variables 
are the average of household characteristics by small areas such as commune. For 
example, from the census we can calculate the average education level of individuals at 
the commune level.  
In the second step, we regress the satisfaction level for the selected common 
variables using data from the PAPI survey. More specifically, we use the following 
model: 
,)ln( iccicic XPAPI εηβ ++=     (2) 
where )ln( icPAPI  is log of the PAPI of household i in cluster c, icX  is the 
vector of the common variables, β  is the vector of regression coefficients, cη  is the 
cluster-specific random effect, and icε  is the individual-specific random effect. The 
subscript ic refers to household i living in cluster c.  
In the third step, we use the following model to estimate the PAPI of a 
household in the census: 
         ,ˆˆ
ˆ)(nˆl iccCensusicic XPAPI εηβ ++=    (3) 
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where βˆ , cηˆ , and icεˆ  denote the estimates for β , cη , and icε . We can use the 
predicted PAPI to calculate the average PAPI level of rural and urban households within 
a district. It should be noted that Monte-Carlo simulations calculate the point estimates 
as well as the standard errors for satisfaction level. In each simulation, we draw a set of 
values βˆ , cηˆ , and icεˆ  from their estimated distributions, and obtain PAPI estimates for 
urban districts and rural districts. After k simulations, we can get the average and 
standard deviation over the k different simulated values of the satisfaction level. 
We can compute the urban-rural difference in PAPI at the provincial and district 
levels. We can produce geographic maps of PAPI as well as the urban-rural difference 
in PAPI at the district level.  
Regressions of urban-rural difference in PAPI  
In the second step, we examine the association between the urban-rural difference in 
local governance quality and several explanatory variables by running a regression of 
the estimated urban-rural difference on explanatory variables at the district level. Since 
the observations are districts, there can be spatial correlation between dependent 
variables and error terms. Thus, we apply the spatial model as follows:  
dddd uXWDD +++= βλα
    (4) 
ddd Muu ερ +=
     (5) 
where dD  is the urban-rural difference in PAPI of district d, and dX  is a vector 
of control variables of the district. W and M are spatial-weighting matrices (with zero 
diagonal elements).  The dependent variables are allowed to be correlated with each 
other. The model is a type of spatial econometric model with first-order spatial-
autoregressive and first-order spatial-autoregressive disturbances (see, e.g., Haining, 
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2003; Drukker et al., 2010, 2011). W and M are spatial-weighting; they are set equal to 
each other and equal to the inverse-distance between centroids of districts. This matrix 
weight allows for the high correlation between nearby districts and for the low 
correlation between far districts.  
 
6. Urban-rural differences in governance quality: empirical results 
Provincial and district governance and public administration   
In this section, we present the results of the models that estimate the relationship 
between weighted PAPI and a number of explanatory variables including demographic 
variables of households (household size, fraction of adults, and age and sex of 
household heads), education and employment of household heads, and assets of 
households. We do this separately for six regions of the country. Data on these variables 
are contained in both the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC surveys. The 2009 VPHC is 
also used to calculate the variable means of communes, for instance the proportion of 
households having different assets in a commune. These commune means are merged to 
the 2011 PAPI survey to estimate the model of PAPI. Explanatory variables are selected 
to be robust in different model specifications.  
Tables A2 through A7 in the appendix present the results of these models. The 
Mekong River Delta has lower R-square values, and other regions have R-square values 
from 0.2 to 0.3. This is reasonable, since it is more difficult to model households’ 
feedback about governance and public administration quality than it is to model other 
welfare indicators such as the income and consumption of households. Once the PAPI 
models are estimated, they are applied to the 2009 VPHC to estimate the weighted PAPI 
for all households in the census. The household PAPI estimates are then aggregated to 
form average PAPI scores for districts and provinces.  
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To examine whether the PAPI estimates are sensitive to the specification of the 
PAPI models, we use two types of models: a large model that includes a large set of 
explanatory variables (as presented in the tables in the appendix), and a small model 
with a smaller number of explanatory variables. Figure A.1 in the appendix compares 
the PAPI estimates at the district and provincial levels among the large and small 
models. They are very similar. We also estimate the unweighted PAPI for districts and 
provinces. The unweighted and weighted PAPI are also similar (see figure A.2 in the 
appendix). In the following, we present the findings of the weighted PAPI in a series of 
figures.  
Figure 1 shows a relatively clear spatial pattern of PAPI. The Northern 
Mountain and Highlands regions have lower PAPI scores, meaning less citizen 
experience with governance and public administration quality. Provinces and districts 
on the Central Coast and in the South East tend to perform better on governance scores. 
Interestingly, there is a large variation in citizens’ satisfaction with governance in the 
districts within a province. In figure 2, we present the proportion of households with 
PAPI estimates belonging to the lowest and highest quintiles of PAPI estimates. The 
pattern is similar to the pattern of the average PAPI. In areas with low PAPI, the 
proportion of households reporting low PAPI is higher, and the proportion of 
households reporting high PAPI is lower.5 
Figure 3 presents the PAPI estimates of provinces by urban and rural 
households. Urban areas have higher PAPI than rural areas. The gap in PAPI between 
urban and rural areas also has a spatial pattern with larger gaps in the Northern 
Mountains and Central Highlands (figure 5). Figure 4 presents the proportion of 
households with low PAPI by urban and rural areas. The higher proportion means a 
                                                 
5
 Figure A.1 in the appendix graphs the density of households with low and high PAPI. In delta and 
coastal areas, the population is high, and as a result there is also a high number of households with low as 
well as high PAPI estimates.  
 14 
 
lower quality of governance and public administration. Differences in PAPI between 
urban and rural households are examined in figures 5 and 6. This shows a pattern 
similar to that of the provincial maps. PAPI gaps tend to be larger in the Northern 
Mountains.6   
Regression of urban-rural gap in governance and public administration  
There is a strong linear relation between the urban-rural gap in citizens’ experiences 
with governance within districts and the average level of district governance (see panel 
A of figure 10). Districts with lower governance performance tend to have a large 
urban-rural gap in governance. This implies that in districts with better governance and 
public administration, both urban and rural people have more positive assessments of 
their governance, so the urban-rural gap in governance decreases. It is also possible that 
better district-level governance encourages better governance of communes within the 
district, for urban and rural communes alike.  
Panel B of figure 10 indicates a U-shaped relation between the urban-rural gap 
in citizens’ experience of governance and welfare levels measured by per-capita 
expenditure. Note that most districts lie on the left of the U-curve. Districts with lower 
welfare levels tend to have larger gaps in urban-rural governance. As the mean per-
capita expenditure increases in a district, the urban-rural gap in governance and public 
administration quality decreases; however, after reaching the bottom, the urban-rural 
gap slightly increases.7 
Table 4 reports the regressions of urban-rural governance at the district level on the 
level of development (measured by average household expenditure).8 We present both 
                                                 
6
 Figure A.2 in the appendix examines the difference in PAPI between Kinh and ethnic minorities.  Kinh 
households are more likely to have higher PAPI than ethnic minorities, even within a district or a 
province. 
7
 The mean per-capita expenditures of districts are obtained from Lanjouw et al. (2013).   
8
 We also put all available explanatory variables in a regression. However, this can cause the problem of 
multicollearity. The results are presented in table A.8 in the appendix.  
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OLS and spatial regressions, which give quite similar results. The results reported 
indicate that the urban-rural difference in citizens’ experiences with governance and 
public administration first increases with the expenditure inequality of the districts, then 
decreases after achieving a peak. This confirms the U-shape pattern that we observe in 
panel B of figure 10. Further, the coefficient of weighted dependent variables (Lambda) 
means there is a spatial correlation between the urban-rural gaps in PAPI of districts. 
The PAPI index and per-capita expenditure of districts are statistically significant and 
reveal a similar trend as indicated by figure 10. Since expenditure inequality (measured 
by the Gini index) is negatively correlated with the expenditure mean of districts 
(Lanjouw, 2013), there is an inverted-U shape between the urban-rural difference in 
governance performance within districts and the Gini index of expenditure.  
Table 5 presents the relationship between the urban-rural governance gap and 
urbanization. It also indicates a U-shaped relation between the urban-rural gap in 
governance and urbanization level, which is measured by the proportion of urban 
population. The results in this table also show that the urban-rural gap in district 
governance tends to be higher in districts with a larger proportion of ethnic minorities 
and in districts with less educated household heads. The urban-rural gap in citizens’ 
experiences with governance is smaller in districts with more assets – proxy by the 
proportion of households having motorbikes. Overall, the urban-rural gap in governance 
is negatively correlated with the welfare level of districts. Better-off districts tend to 
have a smaller urban-rural gap in governance than worse-off districts do.  
 
7. Conclusions 
We have examined the discrepancies in governance and public administration between 
urban and rural areas in Vietnam. We have considered the quality of governance and 
public administration according to six dimensions including participation, transparency, 
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vertical accountability, control of corruption, public administrative procedures, and 
public service delivery. Our analysis suggests that in most dimensions, urban 
governments tend to outperform rural ones, especially in public service delivery. The 
aggregated PAPI scores at the provincial levels are higher in urban than in rural areas. 
We find that overall citizen satisfaction with local and central governance is also higher 
in urban than in rural areas. 
We estimate the PAPI index for urban and rural areas of all districts using the 
small area estimation. Then, we compute the urban-rural difference in districts and 
examine factors associated with this urban-rural difference in PAPI at the district levels. 
We find that districts where PAPI scores are higher also tend to have lower urban-rural 
gaps in governance and public administration performance. This finding alone has the 
important implication that improvement of governance and public administration 
performance at higher levels can help narrow the urban-rural gap.    
Overall, there is a negative correlation between the urban-rural gap in 
governance and public administration performance, on one hand, and the development 
level of districts, on the other. More precisely, there is a U-shaped association between 
the urban-rural gap in governance and the mean expenditure of districts. As the mean 
per-capita expenditure of a district increases, the urban-rural gap in governance and 
public administration decreases, but after reaching the bottom the urban-rural gap 
slightly increases.   
Vietnam, like most other developing countries, faces dual development: fast- 
paced development and urbanization in cities is accompanied by slow-paced 
development in rural areas. This dualism poses a challenging inequality between urban 
and rural areas, not only in economic terms but also in governance and public 
administration. Filling this literature gap, our paper points to the factors that affect 
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discrepancies in urban and rural governance at the local level in Vietnam. The paper has 
provided evidence for some of these determinants that could facilitate improvements in 
quality of governance and public administration performance, as well as in the gap 
between urban and rural areas. 
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Table 1: Dimension scores of governance and public administration  
 
 
  
Areas 
Dimension 1: 
Participation 
at local levels 
Dimension 2: 
Transparency  
Dimension 3: 
Vertical 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 4: 
Public 
Administrative 
Procedure 
Dimension 6: 
Public Service 
Delivery 
Weighted 
PAPI 
Unweighted 
PAPI 
Local 
governance 
quality* 
National 
governance 
quality* 
Total 5.30 5.47 5.50 6.25 6.88 6.75 37.2 36.2 82.6 90.4 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.2) (0.1) (0.5) (0.6) 
Rural 5.31 5.40 5.50 6.20 6.84 6.63 36.8 35.9 82.2 90.4 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.8) 
Urban 5.29 5.67 5.50 6.42 6.99 7.09 38.6 37.0 84.0 90.3 
 
(0.09) (0.13) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.4) (0.4) (0.7) (0.7) 
       
    
Special cities 5.42 6.22 5.36 6.50 7.00 7.39 40.3 37.9 85.2 85.4 
 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.14) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (1.3) 
City grade 1 5.44 5.44 5.37 5.98 7.05 7.23 38.1 36.5 85.8 86.0 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.06) (0.3) (0.2) (1.1) (3.2) 
City grade 2 5.69 6.11 5.86 6.48 7.03 7.29 40.1 38.5 84.9 92.3 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.3) (0.3) (1.2) (1.3) 
City grade 3 5.27 5.42 5.45 6.42 6.93 7.25 38.5 36.7 84.2 90.9 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.2) (0.3) (1.1) (1.7) 
City grades 
4&5 5.23 5.58 5.50 6.47 6.98 6.99 38.3 36.8 83.4 91.0 
 
(0.14) (0.21) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.6) (0.6) (1.1) (1.0) 
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Table 2: Regression of PAPI (governance quality index) on urban variable 
Explanatory variables 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparency 
of Local 
Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Vertical 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Weighted 
PAPI 
Unweighted 
PAPI 
Level of 
Satisfaction 
with Local 
Governance 
Level of 
Satisfaction 
with Central 
Governance 
Urban (urban=1; rural=0) 0.003 0.272* -0.006 0.243** 0.243** 0.470*** 1.865*** 1.125*** 1.766* -0.305 
(0.105) (0.156) (0.055) (0.095) (0.095) (0.060) (0.475) (0.425) (0.897) (1.180) 
Constant 5.301*** 5.404*** 5.506*** 6.194*** 6.194*** 6.632*** 36.798*** 35.884*** 82.217*** 90.492*** 
(0.040) (0.051) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.029) (0.176) (0.161) (0.560) (0.775) 
Observations 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 12729 6519 
R-squared 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.086 0.032 0.011 0.002 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for cluster correlation and sampling weight.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey. 
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Table 3: Regression of PAPI on city variables 
Explanatory variables 
Dimension 1: 
Quality of 
Participation 
in Village 
Decisions 
Dimension 2: 
Transparency of 
Local Decision-
Making 
Dimension 3: 
Vertical 
Accountability 
Dimension 4: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Dimension 5: 
Admin.. 
Procedures 
Dimension 6: 
Public Service 
Delivery 
Weighted 
PAPI 
Unweighted 
PAPI 
Level of 
Satisfaction 
with Local 
Governance 
Level of 
Satisfaction 
with Central 
Governance 
Special cities 0.123 0.818*** -0.145 0.310*** 0.310*** 0.758*** 3.488*** 2.017*** 2.951*** -5.066*** 
 
(0.170) (0.193) (0.147) (0.099) (0.099) (0.050) (0.476) (0.543) (0.947) (1.497) 
City grade 1 0.139 0.031 -0.132 -0.219* -0.219* 0.594*** 1.282*** 0.616** 3.588*** -4.456 
 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.088) (0.131) (0.131) (0.069) (0.340) (0.304) (1.283) (3.297) 
City grade 2 0.387*** 0.710*** 0.359*** 0.283** 0.283** 0.657*** 3.253*** 2.579*** 2.703** 1.811 
 
(0.087) (0.110) (0.097) (0.115) (0.115) (0.053) (0.339) (0.343) (1.331) (1.563) 
City grade 3 -0.036 0.014 -0.060 0.227** 0.227** 0.620*** 1.736*** 0.849*** 2.014 0.437 
 
(0.085) (0.098) (0.079) (0.091) (0.091) (0.041) (0.312) (0.316) (1.275) (1.816) 
City grades 4 & 5 -0.076 0.180 -0.001 0.280** 0.280** 0.353*** 1.464** 0.875 1.163 0.507 
 
(0.151) (0.224) (0.064) (0.134) (0.134) (0.084) (0.691) (0.619) (1.228) (1.446) 
Rural areas  
      
Base    
       
Omitted    
Constant 5.301*** 5.404*** 5.506*** 6.194*** 6.194*** 6.632*** 36.798*** 35.884*** 82.217*** 90.492*** 
 
(0.040) (0.051) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.029) (0.176) (0.161) (0.560) (0.775) 
Observations 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 13642 12729 6519 
R-squared 0.003 0.015 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.099 0.039 0.015 0.002 0.004 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for cluster correlation and sampling weight.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI survey. 
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Table 4: Regression of urban-rural difference in PAPI on aggregate welfare variables 
Explanatory variables  
OLS Spatial regression 
Urban-rural 
difference in 
PAPI index 
Ratio of urban to 
rural PAPI index 
Urban-rural 
difference in 
PAPI index 
Ratio of urban to 
rural PAPI index 
PAPI index of districts -0.2703*** -0.8622*** -0.2530*** -0.7961*** 
 
(0.0516) (0.1465) (0.0524) (0.1499) 
Mean expenditure per capita of 
district 
-0.1475*** -0.4358*** -0.1052* -0.3638** 
(0.0543) (0.1596) (0.0550) (0.1559) 
Squared mean expenditure per 
capita of district 
0.0038*** 0.0114*** 0.0026* 0.0092** 
(0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0041) 
Gini index 76.87*** 219.72*** 55.91** 163.49** 
 
(23.37) (65.67) (22.94) (65.56) 
Squared Gini index -117.95*** -335.84*** -76.32* -223.04** 
 
(40.44) (113.76) (39.00) (111.31) 
Constant 0.8312 105.6198*** 1.3266 105.37*** 
 
(3.9000) (10.9242) (3.9356) (11.25) 
Lambda 0.2574*** 0.0167*** 
 
(0.0354) (0.0033) 
Rho 0.8428*** 0.8480*** 
 
(0.1213) (0.0897) 
Observations 578 578 578 578 
R-squared 0.1457 0.1701 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC. 
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Table 5: Regression of urban-rural difference in PAPI on social-economic variables 
Explanatory variables 
OLS Spatial regression 
Urban-rural 
difference in 
PAPI index 
Ratio of urban to 
rural PAPI index 
Urban-rural 
difference in 
PAPI index 
Ratio of urban to 
rural PAPI index 
Proportion of urban population -0.0406*** -0.1145*** -0.0451*** -0.1302*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0401) (0.0112) (0.0322) 
Proportion of urban population 
squared 
0.0005*** 0.0015*** 0.0006*** 0.0018*** 
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Proportion of ethnic minorities 
population 
0.0284*** 0.0807*** 0.0141*** 0.0498*** 
(0.0033) (0.0095) (0.0038) (0.0105) 
Average number of schooling years 
for household heads of districts 
0.0135 -0.0330 -0.3562*** -0.7998*** 
(0.0728) (0.2074) (0.0902) (0.2504) 
Proportion of households having 
motorbike in districts 
-0.0103* -0.0326* -0.0070 -0.0352* 
(0.0058) (0.0168) (0.0065) (0.0184) 
Mean elevation 10.6003 27.6647 -20.0826* -52.0250* 
 
(12.0536) (33.4421) (10.7274) (31.4159) 
Population density (100,000 people 
per km2) 
-0.0008** -0.0021** -0.0005 -0.0011 
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0010) 
Constant 2.1115*** 106.5757*** 3.1110*** 107.8922*** 
 
(0.5013) (1.4697) (0.6136) (1.8308) 
Lambda 
  
0.3100*** 0.0180*** 
   
(0.0479) (0.0044) 
Rho 
  
0.8010*** 0.7821*** 
   
(0.1433) (0.0836) 
Observations 578 578 578 578 
R-squared 0.1948 0.2090 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC. 
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Figure 1: Weighted PAPI of provinces and districts 
Provinces Districts 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure 2: Percentage of households in lowest and highest quintiles of PAPI  
Lowest quintile of PAPI Highest quintile of PAPI 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure 3: Weighted PAPI of provinces by urban and rural households 
Urban Rural 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
  
 29 
 
Figure 4: Differences in province-weighted PAPI between urban and rural households 
Ratio of urban PAPI to rural PAPI Statistically significant different 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure 5: Percentage of households in the lowest quintile of PAPI by urban and rural 
Urban Rural 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure 6: District PAPI by urban and rural 
Urban Rural 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure 7: Ratio of urban PAPI to rural PAPI of districts 
Ratio of urban PAPI to rural PAPI Statistically significant different 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure 10: Urban-rural difference in PAPI 
Panel A. By average level of PAPI 
Panel A. By average per-capita expenditure 
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Appendixes (to be posted online) 
 
Table A.1. Summary statistics of variables 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variables in household-level data regressions 
     
Weighted PAPI 13642 37.2453 4.4497 23.1308 53.9869 
Unweighted PAPI 13642 36.1538 4.5025 25.3783 53.1082 
Satisfaction level with local governance 12729 82.6364 18.6753 0 100 
Satisfaction level with central governance 6519 90.4214 16.7172 0 100 
Dimension 1: Quality of Participation in Village 
Decisions 13642 5.3021 1.3045 2.0311 9.5179 
Dimension 2: Transparency of Local Decision-
Making 13642 5.4695 1.4218 2.3146 9.7137 
Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability 13642 5.5041 1.2001 4.0628 10 
Dimension 4: Control of Corruption 13642 6.2526 1.4814 3.2543 9.9500 
Dimension 5: Administrative Procedures 13642 6.2526 1.4814 3.2543 9.9500 
Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery 13642 6.7452 0.6844 3.7272 8.8750 
      
Urban and city class 
     
Urban 13642 0.2398 0.4270 0 1 
City special grade 13642 0.0295 0.1693 0 1 
City grade 1 13642 0.0168 0.1284 0 1 
City grade 2 13642 0.0183 0.1340 0 1 
City grade 3 13642 0.0242 0.1535 0 1 
City grades 4 and 5 13642 0.1511 0.3581 0 1 
Variables in district-level data regressions 
     
Urban-rural difference in PAPI index 578 1.705 1.840 -3.203 7.666 
Ratio of urban to rural PAPI index 578 104.790 5.224 90.788 122.656 
PAPI index of districts 578 36.978 1.668 31.193 41.540 
Mean expenditure per capita of district 578 13.357 4.389 4.541 46.377 
Gini index of districts 578 0.273 0.032 0.215 0.424 
Proportion of urban population 578 19.992 22.985 1.014 96.635 
Proportion of ethnic minorities population 578 24.197 33.036 0.000 99.172 
Average number of schooling years for 
household heads of districts 578 5.744 1.260 1.477 7.905 
Proportion of households having motorbike in 
districts 578 73.524 13.801 15.007 95.480 
Population density (100,000 people per km2) 578 0.00608 0.00812 0.00012 0.05693 
Mean elevation (m2) 578 213.814 306.677 0.240 1520.270 
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Table A.2. GLS Regression of weighted PAPI in Northern Mountains 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Err. |Prob|>t 
_intercept_ 3.6198 0.0402 0.0000 
Households have an air conditioner 0.0715 0.0115 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a desk telephone 0.1677 0.0195 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a motorbike 0.1345 0.0202 0.0000 
Households have a radio 0.0537 0.0053 0.0000 
Household have a television 0.0529 0.0073 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a television -0.1066 0.0220 0.0000 
Commune's log of living area per capita -0.0718 0.0150 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of medium-skilled workers -0.2655 0.0631 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of elderly people -0.7254 0.1336 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a solid well -0.0265 0.0098 0.0070 
Commune's proportion of households with tap water 0.0539 0.0136 0.0001 
Commune's proportion of households with a toilet 0.1002 0.0108 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with solid walls 0.0826 0.0083 0.0000 
Urban*Commune's proportion of households with a motorbike 0.0504 0.0146 0.0006 
Urban* Head is an unskilled worker 0.0445 0.0121 0.0002 
Adjusted-R2 0.2906 
Observations 2644 
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Table A.3. GLS Regression of weighted PAPI in Red River Delta 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Err. |Prob|>t 
_intercept_ 3.2693 0.0695 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a deep well -0.0285 0.0064 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a motorbike 0.2852 0.0344 0.0000 
Household has a radio 0.0299 0.0048 0.0000 
Household has a television 0.0420 0.0114 0.0002 
Household size 0.0038 0.0014 0.0045 
Household head is a skilled worker 0.0517 0.0091 0.0000 
Log of the number of firms in commune -0.0272 0.0023 0.0000 
Commune's log of living area per capita -0.1075 0.0179 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of not working people -0.2857 0.0453 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a solid roof 0.1343 0.0174 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a solid well -0.0364 0.0094 0.0001 
Commune's proportion of households with a flush toilet 0.5175 0.0772 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a toilet 0.4132 0.0728 0.0000 
Urban * cities class 2 0.0871 0.0100 0.0000 
Urban * household size -0.0096 0.0022 0.0000 
Adjusted-R2 0.2261 
  
Observations 2477 
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Table A.4. GLS Regression of weighted PAPI in Central Coast 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Err. |Prob|>t 
_intercept_ 3.5168 0.0084 0.0000 
City class 1 0.0542 0.0080 0.0000 
Household has a computer 0.0298 0.0053 0.0000 
Household has a motorbike 0.0203 0.0053 0.0001 
Household has a radio 0.0216 0.0054 0.0001 
Commune's proportion of people with secondary school education 0.0499 0.0201 0.0132 
Commune's proportion of household heads with secondary school 0.2057 0.0201 0.0000 
Household head is a skilled worker 0.0355 0.0070 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a solid roof 0.1644 0.0157 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a solid well -0.0425 0.0061 0.0000 
Household has tap water 0.0127 0.0059 0.0303 
Commune's proportion of households with a toilet 0.0423 0.0100 0.0000 
Urban * household has a television 0.0805 0.0131 0.0000 
Urban * Commune's proportion of ethnic minorities 0.2761 0.0364 0.0000 
Adjusted-R2 0.2413 
Observations 3069 
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Table A.5. GLS Regression of weighted PAPI in Central Highlands 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Err. |Prob|>t 
_intercept_ 3.9896 0.0566 0.0000 
Household has a desk telephone -0.0168 0.0075 0.0259 
Household has a radio 0.0468 0.0100 0.0000 
Household has a television 0.0357 0.0139 0.0106 
Ethnic minorities (yes=1) -0.0339 0.0078 0.0000 
Commune's log of living area per capita -0.1858 0.0236 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of people working in public sector 0.4775 0.1450 0.0010 
Household has tap water 0.0532 0.0107 0.0000 
Household head is an unskilled worker -0.0460 0.0080 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with solid walls 0.1381 0.0208 0.0000 
Urban * Commune's proportion of ethnic minorities -0.1662 0.0394 0.0000 
Urban * household size 0.0104 0.0023 0.0000 
Urban * Commune's proportion of households with semi-solid 
walls -0.1785 0.0368 0.0000 
Adjusted-R2 0.1977 
  
Observations 979 
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Table A.6. GLS Regression of weighted PAPI in South East 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Err. |Prob|>t 
_intercept_ 3.5031 0.0461 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of household heads with secondary school -0.1100 0.0416 0.0083 
Household head is a skilled worker 0.0320 0.0068 0.0000 
Commune's log of living area per capita -0.0702 0.0121 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of people working in public sector 0.4646 0.0914 0.0000 
Household has tap water 0.0396 0.0058 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with solid walls 0.3474 0.0346 0.0000 
Adjusted-R2 1687 
  
Observations 0.2172 
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Table A.7. GLS Regression of weighted PAPI in Mekong River Delta 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Err. |Prob|>t 
_intercept_ 3.2002 0.0315 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of households with a motorbike 0.0863 0.0155 0.0000 
Household has a radio 0.0348 0.0051 0.0000 
Household has a television 0.0347 0.0077 0.0000 
Commune's proportion of household heads with secondary school 0.6444 0.0655 0.0000 
Ethnic minorities (yes=1) -0.0372 0.0073 0.0000 
Commune's log of living area per capita 0.0938 0.0117 0.0000 
Head is a medium-skilled worker 0.0266 0.0080 0.0008 
Commune's proportion of not working people -0.1066 0.0341 0.0018 
Commune's proportion of households with a solid roof -1.2863 0.2904 0.0000 
Urban * Commune's proportion of households with a solid roof 1.0439 0.2844 0.0002 
Adjusted-R2 2693 
Observations 0.1614 
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Table A.8: Regression of urban-rural difference in PAPI 
Explanatory variables 
OLS Spatial regression 
Urban-rural 
difference in 
PAPI index 
Ratio of urban to 
rural PAPI index 
Urban-rural 
difference in 
PAPI index 
Ratio of urban to 
rural PAPI index 
PAPI index of districts -0.3393*** -1.0527*** -0.2289*** -0.7797*** 
 
(0.0511) (0.1437) (0.0482) (0.1489) 
Mean expenditure per capita of 
district 
0.3230*** 0.9093*** 0.0507 0.1709 
(0.0998) (0.2777) (0.0942) (0.2687) 
Squared mean expenditure per 
capita of district 
-0.0047*** -0.0130*** 0.00002 0.0007 
(0.0018) (0.0049) (0.0020) (0.0055) 
Gini index -14.4241 -43.4131 16.7794 26.4318 
 
(23.3624) (65.4324) (23.9648) (69.5770) 
Squared Gini index 30.2802 89.8816 -14.7842 -8.8865 
 
(39.5780) (111.1076) (39.5427) (114.6098) 
Proportion of urban population -0.0557*** -0.1580*** -0.0526*** -0.1472*** 
 
(0.0154) (0.0432) (0.0114) (0.0325) 
Proportion of urban population 
squared 
0.0007*** 0.0019*** 0.0007*** 0.0020*** 
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Proportion of ethnic minorities 
population 
0.0361*** 0.1024*** 0.0106** 0.0468*** 
(0.0043) (0.0121) (0.0049) (0.0147) 
Average number of schooling years 
for household heads of districts 
0.1370* 0.3568* -0.2268*** -0.3826 
(0.0711) (0.1981) (0.0877) (0.2567) 
Proportion of households having 
motorbike in districts 
-0.0205*** -0.0607*** -0.0086 -0.0415** 
(0.0059) (0.0169) (0.0061) (0.0203) 
Mean elevation 
-4.2527 -14.1578 -30.3672*** -91.3481*** 
(12.8198) (35.5058) (11.4610) (33.7487) 
Population density (100,000 people 
per km2) 
-0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0007* -0.0017 
(0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0011) 
Constant 13.0428*** 141.0466*** 6.7098* 125.5319*** 
 
(3.6831) (10.1910) (3.9441) (11.5772) 
Lambda 
  
0.6481 0.0207 
   
0.1269 0.0042 
Rho 
  
0.3355 0.8285 
   
0.0127 0.1093 
Observations 578 578 578 578 
R-squared 0.2794 0.3050 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure A.1: Number of households in lowest and highest quintiles of PAPI  
Lowest quintile of PAPI Highest quintile of PAPI 
  
Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC 
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Figure A.2: PAPI by Kinh and ethnic minorities 
Kinh Ethnic minorities 
  
 Source: Estimation from the 2011 PAPI and the 2009 VPHC  
